ABSTRACT
This proposed SDN would survey the various accounting stratagems which governments have used to meet fiscal targets—thereby sidestepping the need for true adjustment—and suggest remedial actions to limit this type of fiscal non-transparency. Types of creative accounting to be covered would include, for instance, currency swaps to hide a debt build-up (as in Greece in 2001–07), sale and leaseback of government property (for example, in the United States), assumption of long-term pension obligations in exchange for short-term revenue (Argentina, Hungary, and other Eastern European countries), use of public-private partnerships to defer the recognition of investment spending (for instance, Portugal), and reliance on non-cash compensation (such as pension rights) to reduce measured wage bills (in the United States, United Kingdom, etc.) As is evident from the examples given, these fiscal tricks have recently come under increased international scrutiny, highlighting the importance of good fiscal reporting, accounting, and transparency in general, for avoiding unpleasant surprises, ensuring government accountability, and containing fiscal vulnerabilities.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1202.pdf
y en http://www.fiscus.com.ar/pdfs/fmi_accounting_devices.pdf
INDICE
Executive summary 3
I Introduction 4
II A Taxonomy of Accounting Devices 5
III Hidden Borrowing 6
IV Disinvestment 7
V Deferred Spending 8
VI Foregone Investment 10
VII Disappearing Government 11
VIII The Size of the Problem 12
IX Countering Accounting Devices 14
X Conclusion 19
Tables
1 Taxonomy of Deficit Devices 5
2 Composition of Recognized Liabilities of Five Central Governments, 2010 10
3 US Federal Government’s Summary of Long-Term Fiscal Projections, 2010 17
4 A Suite of Balance Indicators, Australia, 2009–1018
5 A Comprehensive Balance Sheet 19
Figures
1 European Union: Relationship of Accounting Devices, 1993‒2003 and CDS
Spreads, January 2011 13
2 Two Measures of the US Federal Government Deficit, 1995–2010 14
References 20